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NGO STANDING AND INFLUENCE IN 
REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COURTS AND 
COMMISSIONS 
Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer* 
INTRODUCTION 
ongovernmental organizations (“NGOs”) are well-known actors 
in the development and implementation of international human 
rights law.1 Nevertheless, how exactly they are involved in various hu-
man rights institutions has only occasionally been studied, and then often 
with a focus on the broad sweep of NGO involvement across many inter-
national bodies rather than with a deeper focus on involvement in partic-
ular types of international human rights entities.2 This Article seeks to 
take a first step toward filling that gap by considering how NGOs both 
can be and are involved in proceedings before the major regional human 
rights enforcement systems. 
For purposes of this Article, the term NGO is defined using three of 
the five characteristics identified by Lester M. Salamon and Helmut K. 
Anheier. Those characteristics are: “(a) formally constituted; (b) organi-
zationally separate from government; [and] (c) non-profit-seeking.” 3 
These characteristics distinguish NGOs from other common types of or-
ganizations, specifically governmental bodies, businesses, and informal 
entities such as families and households.4 The other two characteristics 
Salamon and Anheier identify—“self-governing” and “voluntary to some 
significant degree”5—are not used because, while these two characteris-
tics are commonly associated with NGOs in the popular understanding of 
                                                                                                                                     
 *  Professor, Notre Dame Law School. I am very grateful for comments from my 
fellow symposium participants, the research assistance of Duy Nguyen and Gregory 
Ramsower, and the hosting of this symposium by the Dennis J. Block Center for the 
Study of International Business Law and the Brooklyn Journal of International Law. 
 1. See, e.g., Felix Ermacora, Non-governmental Organizations as Promoters of Hu-
man Rights, in PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS: THE EUROPEAN DIMENSION 171, 173–74 
(Franz Matscher & Herbert Petzold eds., 2d ed. 1990) (listing seven categories of NGO 
activities relating to human rights). 
 2. For an example of a more focused, although now dated, study, see Dinah Shelton, 
The Participation of Nongovernmental Organizations in International Judicial Proceed-
ings, 88 AM. J. INT’L L. 611 (1994). 
 3. LESTER M. SALAMON & HELMUT K. ANHEIER, THE EMERGING NONPROFIT SECTOR: 
AN OVERVIEW xvii–xviii (John Hopkins Nonprofit Sector Ser. No. 1, 1996). 
 4. See JON VAN TIL, GROWING CIVIL SOCIETY: FROM NONPROFIT SECTOR TO THIRD 
SPACE 20–21 (2000). 
 5. SALAMON & ANHEIER, supra note 3, at xviii. 
N
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that term, they are not necessary to distinguish NGOs from the other 
common types of organizations listed above. 
The human rights enforcement systems considered in the Article are 
for Europe, the Americas, and Africa. All three of these regional systems 
have at one time or another used the dual institutions of a commission 
and a separate court. The European system moved to a court-only system 
a little over ten years ago, however, and the African system has only re-
cently had its court begin operations.6 But to the extent that both institu-
tions functioned in each of the systems during the time period under con-
sideration, the role of NGOs are reviewed with respect to not only the 
courts but also the commissions. 
The focus of this inquiry is on decisions or judgments on the merits.7 
These decisions are in many ways only the tip of the iceberg in that most 
applications filed with the commissions and courts are resolved short of 
such a decision, usually either by a determination that the application 
does not satisfy the criteria for admissibility—such as exhaustion of do-
mestic remedies8—or through a settlement. NGOs also are involved with 
these bodies in a number of ways other than through participating in ac-
tual cases.9 Nevertheless, there are two reasons for this focus on deci-
sions on the merits. First, the impact of NGOs on the development of 
international human rights law is arguably strongest when they are in-
volved in decisions on the merits that resolve not only the specific viola-
tions alleged in a given case but also interpret and develop that law. Se-
cond, the decisions on the merits are one of the most visible outputs of 
these human rights enforcement systems.10 
                                                                                                                                     
 6. See infra nn. 27, 54 and accompanying text. 
 7. While the various bodies use different labels for such decisions, for the sake of 
clarity, this Article will refer to all decisions, judgments, or other determinations regard-
ing whether a member state has, or has not, violated the relevant human rights laws as 
“decisions on the merits.” 
 8. See infra nn. 34, 46, and 56, and accompanying text. 
 9. See, e.g., EVELYN A. ANKUMAH, THE AFRICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN AND 
PEOPLES’ RIGHTS: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURES 2 (1996) (describing efforts by NGOs “to 
make the [African] Commission more accessible”); id. at 186 (describing other ways 
NGOs are permitted to be involved in African Commission activities); RACHEL MURRAY, 
THE AFRICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES’ RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 
88 (2000) (describing other ways NGOs are permitted to be involved in African Commis-
sion activities); Nina Vajic, Some Concluding Remarks on NGOs and the European 
Court of Human Rights, in CIVIL SOCIETY, INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND COMPLIANCE 
BODIES 93, 96–97 (Tullio Treves et al. eds., 2005) [hereinafter CIVIL SOCIETY] (describ-
ing efforts by NGOs to further human rights in Europe). 
 10. See ANKUMAH, supra note 9, at 1–2 (noting the limited availability of public in-
formation about the activities of the African Commission). 
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Part I of this Article considers how NGOs can be involved under the 
existing conventions or charters that govern the operation of these sys-
tems. Consideration of these documents reveals that in each system 
NGOs are able to serve in a variety of roles, including as applicants, as 
representatives of the alleged victims, and as third parties serving in an 
amicus curiae or intervener role, although there are some variations.11 
The most important variation is that in the Americas, which use a dual 
commission/court structure, the ability to serve in these multiple roles is 
initially only with respect to the commission, with the court only consid-
ering matters referred to it by the commission. 12  In this system, the 
commission therefore serves a gate-keeping function, including with re-
spect to cases in which NGOs are involved. However, NGOs involved at 
the commission stage often are also involved at the court stage, if it oc-
curs in a given case.13 In the African system, NGOs may bring cases be-
fore the commission, and NGOs that have received “observer” status be-
fore the commission may bring cases before the court.14 
Part II considers how NGOs can be involved in these systems by look-
ing at all decisions on the merits rendered during the ten-year period 
from 2000 through 2009. Consideration of these decisions reveals both 
striking similarities and differences. The most significant similarity is 
that NGO involvement is primarily in the form of serving as representa-
tives of alleged victims of human rights violations. The most significant 
differences are that NGO involvement in the European system is concen-
trated both with respect to the member states and the specific NGOs in-
volved and occurs only in a relatively small proportion of the decisions.15 
In contrast, in the Inter-American system, NGOs are involved in a much 
higher proportion of the decisions, and while there are concentrations 
with respect to the specific NGOs, there are less apparent concentrations 
with respect to member states. Finally, in the African system, there is 
also a high proportion of NGO involvement but no obvious concentra-
tions either with respect to the specific NGOs or member states involved. 
                                                                                                                                     
 11. While the parties bringing allegations of human rights violations are identified by 
different labels by the various bodies considered in this Article, for the sake of clarity this 
Article shall refer to all such parties as “applicants.” 
 12. See infra note 42 and accompanying text. 
 13. See infra note 48 and accompanying text. 
 14. See infra note 60 and accompanying text. 
 15. While the three systems use different labels for countries that have consented to 
be subject to such systems, and the degree of that consent can vary, for the sake of sim-
plicity and because it does not impact the analysis that is the focus of this Article, all 
countries that have agreed to be subject to these systems such that decisions on the merits 
can be rendered against them will be referred to as “member states” with respect to the 
relevant system. 
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Part III then considers the ramifications of the permitted and actual de-
gree of NGO involvement in these systems. One ramification is the im-
portance of NGOs as representatives of alleged victims of human rights 
violations, although that importance varies as between the different sys-
tems. Variations may arise from a number of factors, including the avail-
ability of legal aid (or lack thereof) and the size and relative strength of 
the legal bar in member states. Another ramification is that in Europe, the 
role of NGOs appears primarily to draw attention to human rights viola-
tions in a relatively narrow set of member states where conditions for 
private representation of alleged victims may not exist, while in the 
Americas and Africa, it appears that there is a broader need for NGOs to 
represent alleged victims from a broad swath of the member states. These 
ramifications suggest that the development and support of human rights 
NGOs should perhaps be targeted in different ways in these different sys-
tems. Finally, both the relatively close ties between the most active 
NGOs and the larger international human rights community and the rela-
tive open access of not only NGOs but private parties of all types to these 
systems suggests that there is no need to carefully screen NGOs before 
they can become involved, as has been done at least to some extent for 
the African court. This approach contrasts with that taken with respect to 
many other international bodies, as others have discussed in this Sympo-
sium, where NGOs often have privileged access to deliberations and dis-
cussions as compared to other private parties.16 
I. NGO INVOLVEMENT IN THEORY 
Each court has its own procedural rules that govern what entities may 
formally appear before the commissions and courts and in what capaci-
ties. Individuals and groups who are not able to take advantage of these 
formal avenues of participation may still be able to influence the court 
through other means, such as by urging entities to exercise the right to 
appear or by encouraging member states to alter the rules or judicial 
composition of the commissions and courts. Such indirect means are, 
however, necessarily filtered by the other entities involved, making it 
difficult to determine how much influence NGOs actually have through 
these avenues. Such indirect means are also much more difficult to iden-
tify. For these reasons, the focus here is on the extent to which NGOs 
                                                                                                                                     
 16. See generally Shamima Ahmed, NGOs Impact on International Organizations: 
Complexities and Considerations, 36 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 817 (2011); Dana Brakman Rei-
ser & Claire R. Kelly, Linking NGO Accountability and the Legitimacy of Global Gov-
ernance, 36 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1011 (2011). 
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may themselves come before the courts and, where applicable, related 
commissions. 
A. European Court of Human Rights 
When initially created in 1959, under what is commonly known as the 
European Convention on Human Rights (the “European Convention”), 
individuals and private groups, including NGOs, did not have the right to 
appear before the European Court of Human Rights (the “ECHR”).17 
However, with the agreement of the applicable member states, individu-
als and groups, including NGOs, could file complaints with the European 
Commission of Human Rights (the “European Commission”), claiming a 
violation by one of the member states of his, her, or its rights as set forth 
in the European Convention.18 The European Commission could in turn 
bring cases to the ECHR if it deemed the complaint admissible and irre-
solvable by friendly settlement.19 The European Commission generally 
exercised this option if it viewed the case as involving “an important 
question of interpretation of the [European] Convention.”20 Even in in-
stances where the European Commission brought such cases, the Com-
mission was the party before the ECHR, not the individual or group that 
had filed the complaint, although the ECHR eventually provided an op-
portunity for the original complainant to participate through the ECHR’s 
procedural rules.21 
Individuals and groups, including NGOs, also had the ability from at 
least 1989 forward to ask the President of the ECHR for the opportunity 
to intervene in any given case, which opportunity would be granted if 
doing so would be in the “interest of the proper administration of jus-
tice.”22 Over time, the President granted such opportunities to both indi-
viduals and NGOs in a number of cases.23 Individuals and groups, in-
                                                                                                                                     
 17. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 
44, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Original European Convention]. 
 18. Id. art. 25(1); DONNA GOMIEN ET AL., LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE EUROPEAN 
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER 42 (1996); ANNA–
KARIN LINDBLOM, NON–GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 246 
(2005). 
 19. GOMIEN, supra note 18, at 73; see also Original European Convention, supra note 
17, art. 48(a). 
 20. GOMIEN, supra note 18, at 73. 
 21. GOMIEN, supra note 18, at 79–80; LINDBLOM, supra note 18; Shelton, supra note 
2, at 630. 
 22. GOMIEN, supra note 18, at 80; LINDBLOM, supra note 18, at 329. 
 23. Abdelsalam A. Mohamed, Individual and NGO Participation in Human Rights 
Litigation Before the African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights: Lessons from the 
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cluding NGOs, also had the ability from 1994 forward to ask the ECHR 
to consider their complaint after the European Commission had issued a 
report even without a referral by the Commission, but the ECHR could 
decline to do so if a three-judge panel of the ECHR concluded that there 
was not a sufficient reason to consider the case.24 Even given these vari-
ous avenues for participation before 1998, it appears NGOs participated 
in only several dozen cases in total.25 This compares to over a thousand 
ECHR judgments on the merits between 1959 and 1998, when Protocol 
11 to the European Convention came into effect.26 
When Protocol 11 went into effect in 1998, it eliminated the European 
Commission but, at the same time, greatly expanded the entities that had 
a right to bring a case before the ECHR.27 More specifically, Protocol 11 
amended Article 34 of the European Convention to provide that “[t]he 
Court may receive [individual] applications from any person, non-
governmental organisation [sic] or group of individuals claiming to be 
the victim of a violation by one of the High Contracting Parties of the 
rights set forth in the Convention or the protocols thereto.”28 Protocol 11 
also amended Article 36 of the European Convention to maintain the au-
thority of the President to invite other persons to appear before the court 
in a given case if doing so is in the interest of the proper administration 
of justice.29 While a new protocol that went into effect in 2010 signifi-
                                                                                                                                     
European and Inter–American Courts of Human Rights, 43 J. AFR. L. 201, 207–08 
(1999). 
 24. Protocol No. 9 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms art. 5 ¶¶ 1(e)–2, Nov. 6, 1990, E.T.S. No. 140, repealed by Protocol 
No. 11 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms, May 11, 1994, E.T.S. No. 155; GOMIEN, supra note 18, at 74; LINDBLOM, supra 
note 18, at 246. 
 25. See, e.g., LINDBLOM, supra note 18, at 330 (finding that NGOs filed amicus curi-
ae briefs in “at least” thirty-six cases from 1969 to Sept. 30, 1998); see also Shelton, 
supra note 2, at 632 (as of 1994, describing the ECHR’s track record with respect to ac-
cepting third-party participation in cases). 
 26. See LINDBLOM, supra note 18, at 253. 
 27. Protocol No. 11 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fun-
damental Freedoms, May 11, 1994, E.T.S. No. 155 [hereinafter Protocol 11]; see also 
GOMIEN, supra note 18, at 91; LINDBLOM, supra note 18, at 247. 
 28. Protocol 11, supra note 27, art. 34; Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 34, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, amended by 
Protocol 11, supra note 27, and Protocol No. 14 to the Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, May 13, 2004, C.E.T.S. 194 [hereinafter 
Amended European Convention]. 
 29. Protocol 11, supra note 27, art. 36; Amended European Convention, supra note 
28, art. 36(2). 
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cantly altered the ECHR’s procedures, the protocol did not change these 
avenues for NGO participation in cases before the Court.30 
As the language of current Article 34 of the European Convention in-
dicates, an NGO that wants to appear as an applicant before the ECHR 
must satisfy the same requirements as any other type of person seeking to 
make such an appearance, i.e., it must have a claim that it has been the 
victim of a violation by a member state of the rights set forth in the Eu-
ropean Convention.31 It is apparently not sufficient that the rights of the 
group of individuals which the NGO represents have been violated; to 
meet this requirement it must be the rights of the NGO itself that have 
been violated.32 The ECHR has not fully determined what rights set forth 
in the European Convention actually apply to NGOs, but assuming an 
NGO can claim to be a victim of a violation of an applicable right,33 it 
clearly may bring a case before the ECHR if it meets the other threshold 
requirements, such as exhausting domestic remedies.34 To appear at the 
invitation of the President in a given case, the President must determine 
that such an invitation to an NGO, like an invitation to any other entity, 
is “in the interest of the proper administration of justice.”35 NGOs there-
fore do not have any avenues for appearing before the ECHR that are not 
common to other types of entities. Not all NGOs may take advantage of 
these avenues, however. It appears that only NGOs legally established 
within one of the member states generally qualify, although there have 
been exceptions when the entity’s lack of formal legal establishment is 
related to its rights violation claim.36 
The expansion of what entities can be claimants before the ECHR also 
provides another potential avenue for NGO participation in ECHR cases: 
serving as the representative of such entities, which could include both 
individuals and groups claiming to be victims of a violation by a member 
                                                                                                                                     
 30. Protocol No. 14 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fun-
damental Freedoms, May 13, 2004, C.E.T.S. 194; THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE 
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 36–37 (Pieter van Dijk et al. eds., 4th ed. 
2006) [hereinafter THEORY AND PRACTICE]. 
 31. Amended European Convention, supra note 28, art. 34; LINDBLOM, supra note 18, 
at 252. 
 32. Marco Frigessi di Rattalma, NGOs before the European Court of Human Rights: 
Beyond Amicus Curiae Participation?, in CIVIL SOCIETY, supra note 9, at 57, 60. 
 33. See THEORY AND PRACTICE, supra note 30, at 53–55 (discussing which rights 
have been found excisable by a legal, as well as by a natural, person). 
 34. Amended European Convention, supra note 28, art. 35(1). 
 35. Id. art. 36(2); Rules of the Court, 2010 Eur. Ct. H.R., R. 44(3)(a) [hereinafter 
ECHR Rules]. 
 36. See LINDBLOM, supra note 18, at 247–51. 
918 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 36:3 
state of the rights set forth in the European Convention.37 While the fees 
for representatives are generally paid by the defendant member state if 
the alleged victim is successful in his or her claim, NGOs (and other rep-
resentatives) may also be paid for their services through a legal aid sys-
tem established by the Council of Europe “for applicants who do not 
have sufficient means.”38 However, at least one prominent human rights 
organization that is active before the ECHR has complained that the legal 
aid payments are “very low.”39 As discussed in the next Part, serving as a 
representative has become the primary way NGOs come before the 
ECHR. 
B. Inter-American Human Rights Commission and Inter-American Court 
of Human Rights 
Similar to the initial structure of the European human rights system, 
the Inter-American system contains both the Inter-American Commis-
sion on Human Rights (the “Inter-American Commission”) and the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights (the “IACHR”). Unlike the European 
system, however, the Inter-American system began with only the Inter-
American Commission in 1959, formed under the American Declaration 
of the Rights and Duties of Man (the “Declaration”), although it was lat-
er incorporated into the Charter of the Organization of American States 
and the subsequent American Convention on Human Rights (the “Amer-
ican Convention”).40 It was not until the American Convention entered 
into effect in 1979 that the IACHR came into existence.41 Also unlike the 
                                                                                                                                     
 37. See Ermacora, supra note 1, at 177 (prior to Protocol 11, NGOs could serve as 
counsel to European Commission applicants). 
 38. Basic Information on Procedures § 1(3), EUR. CT. H.R. 
http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/en/header/the+court/how+the+court+works/procedure+befo
re+the+court (last visited May 22, 2011). 
 39. Taking a Case to the European Court of Human Rights, LIBERTY 
http://www.yourrights.org.uk/yourrights/the-human-rights-act/taking-a-case-to-the-
european-court-of-human-rights.html (last updated Aug. 18, 2008) [hereinafter Taking a 
Case to the European Court of Human Rights]. 
 40. American Convention on Human Rights pmbl., art. 33(a), Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 
U.N.T.S. 123 [hereinafter American Convention]; SCOTT DAVIDSON, THE INTER–
AMERICAN HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM 15–16, 99 (1997); see also Charter of the Organiza-
tion of American States, art. 53(e), Apr. 30, 1948, 119 U.N.T.S. 3. The United States is a 
party to the Declaration and so is subject to the jurisdiction of the Inter-American Com-
mission. However, the U.S. has not ratified the American Convention and so is not sub-
ject to the jurisdiction of the IACHR. See B–32: American Convention on Human Rights, 
INTER–AM. COMM’N H.R., 
http://www.cidh.oas.org/Basicos/English/Basic4.Amer.Conv.Ratif.htm (last visited Jan. 
24, 2011) (showing that the United States has not ratified the Convention). 
 41. See American Convention, supra note 40, arts. 52–69. 
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European system, the Inter-American system continues to this day to 
have this two-part structure. 
Only member states or the Inter-American Commission may bring cas-
es directly to the IACHR.42 All others alleging violations of the Ameri-
can Convention, including NGOs, must bring their complaints to the In-
ter-American Commission instead. More specifically, Article 44 of the 
American Convention permits “[a]ny person or group of persons, or any 
nongovernmental entity legally recognized in one or more member 
states” to file a petition with the Inter-American Commission.43 In con-
trast to the European system, the person filing the petition need not be 
the victim of the alleged American Convention violation; instead, the 
filer may assert a claim on behalf of any specific victim.44 The fact that 
the NGO filing a petition need only be organized in any member state 
and not necessarily in the member state where the alleged violation oc-
curred, also means NGOs that are relatively insulated from retaliation by 
the member state involved could bring a claim on behalf of residents of 
that member state, if those residents could be identified with sufficient 
specificity.45  In addition, the petition must meet certain threshold re-
quirements, including exhaustion of domestic remedies.46 
NGOs also have at least two other avenues for participation in cases 
before the Inter-American Commission and the IACHR. First, NGOs 
may serve as representatives of other petitioners before the Inter-
American Commission.47 If the Inter-American Commission then refers 
the petition to the IACHR, which is generally required if the member 
state has not complied with the Commission’s final recommendations 
within a certain time period, the IACHR’s Rules of Procedure permit the 
autonomous submission of pleaders, motions, and evidence by not only 
                                                                                                                                     
 42. DAVIDSON, supra note 40, at 138. 
 43. American Convention, supra note 40, art. 44; DAVIDSON, supra note 40, at 156 
(States that are party to the Convention have no ability to deny this right of petition as 
against them); see also Statute of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, art. 
19(a), Oct. 1979, O.A.S.T.S. Res. 447 (IX-0/79), O.A.S. Off. Rec. OEA/Ser.P/IX.0.2/80. 
 44. American Convention, supra note 40, art. 44; DAVIDSON, supra note 40, at 157; 
LINDBLOM, supra note 18, at 271–72. 
 45. See DAVIDSON, supra note 40, at 157. For purposes of this Article, NGOs filing 
claims on behalf of others are classified as “representatives” of the alleged victims even if 
the NGOs are acting without a formal relationship with or consent from the alleged vic-
tims. 
 46. American Convention, supra note 40, arts. 46–47. 
 47. R. P. Inter–Am. Ct. H.R. 2(26), 25(1) [hereinafter IACHR Rules]; R. P. Inter–
Am. Comm’n H.R. 23. 
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the alleged victims, but also their “duly accredited representatives.”48 
Neither the Commission nor the IACHR appears to have a legal aid sys-
tem in place to help petitioners who lack the financial means to hire rep-
resentatives.49 Second, those rules also provide for amicus curiae briefs 
before the IACHR.50 The Inter-American Commission has also permitted 
such briefs on occasion, although there does not appear to be a clear legal 
basis for doing so.51 
Given the breadth of Article 44 of the Convention, there has been little 
if any need for either the Inter-American Commission or the IACHR to 
develop a definition of the term NGO. The only significant limitation is 
that under Article 44, an NGO filing a petition before the Inter-American 
Commission must be legally recognized by one or more member states.52 
In practice, this requirement does not appear to have been a significant 
barrier for NGO involvement, presumably because it is the NGOs 
formed under the laws of one of the member states that are interested in 
bringing alleged violations of the American Convention to the attention 
of the Inter-American Commission. 
C. African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and African 
Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
The current African human rights system also operates under a dual 
commission/court structure. The African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights (the “African Commission”) began operations in 1987 
under the auspices of Article 30 of the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights (the “African Charter”).53 The Protocol to the African 
Charter (the “Protocol”), which entered into force in 2004, created the 
                                                                                                                                     
 48. IACHR Rules, supra note 47, 2(26), 25(1); R. P. Inter–Am. Comm’n H.R. 45(1); 
Tara J. Melish, The Inter –American Court of Human Rights: Beyond Progressivity, in 
SOCIAL RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE: EMERGING TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL AND 
COMPARATIVE LAW 372, 378–79 (Malcolm Langford ed., 2008) [hereinafter SOCIAL 
RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE]; DAVIDSON, supra note 40, at 204 (describing the referral pro-
cess). 
 49. Melish, supra note 48, at 380–81. 
 50. IACHR Rules, supra note 47, 44; see also LINDBLOM, supra note 18, at 355–56 
(discussing how, even before enactment of this rule, NGOs successfully submitted ami-
cus curiae briefs in a number of IACHR cases); see also Shelton¸ supra note 2, at 638 
(“the [IACHR] appears never to have rejected an amicus filing”). 
 51. LINDBLOM, supra note 18, at 355. 
 52. American Convention, supra note 40, art. 44. 
 53. Afr. Charter on Hum. & Peoples’ Rts., art. 30, June 27, 1981, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982) 
[hereinafter African Charter]; History, AFR. COMM’N HUM. & PEOPLES’ RTS., 
http://www.achpr.org/english/_info/history_en.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2011). 
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African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (the “ACHPR”).54 The 
African Union has, however, determined that the ACHPR should be 
merged into the African Court for Justice, although the latter court has 
yet to begin operations so it not clear if and when that merger will actual-
ly occur.55 
An application relating to the rights referred to in the African Charter 
will be considered by the African Commission if certain threshold re-
quirements are met, including the exhaustion of local remedies (unless it 
is obvious that local procedures are unduly prolonged) and approval by a 
majority of the African Commission’s members.56 It appears that any 
individual or entity, including an NGO, may submit such an application 
to the African Commission either on its own behalf or on behalf of 
someone else.57 A party submitting such an application may have legal 
representation, and there does not appear to be any restriction that would 
prevent an NGO from serving in that role. 58  Finally, it appears that 
NGOs may participate as amici curiae before the African Commission.59 
The African Commission and the ACHPR can refer cases to each oth-
er, and NGOs that have been granted “observer” status by the African 
Commission may bring cases to the ACHPR under Article 5 of the Pro-
tocol.60 The African Commission has in fact granted such status to al-
                                                                                                                                     
 54. Protocol to the Afr. Charter on Hum. & Peoples’ Rts. on the Establishment of an 
Afr. Ct. on Hum. & Peoples’ Rts., art. 1, June 9, 1998, OAU Doc. 
OAU/LEG/EXP/AFCHPR/PROT (III) [hereinafter African Charter Protocol]; History, 
AFR. CT. HUM. & PEOPLES’ RTS., http://www.african-court.org/en/court/history/ (last vis-
ited Jan. 24, 2011). 
 55. The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, AFR. INT’L COURTS & 
TRIBUNALS, http://www.aict-ctia.org/courts_conti/achpr/achpr_home.html (last visited 
Jan. 24, 2011). 
 56. African Charter, supra note 53, arts. 55(2), 56. 
 57. Guidelines for Submission of Communications, AFR. COMM’N HUM. & PEOPLES’ 
RTS., http://www.achpr.org/english/_info/guidelines_communications_en.html (last visit-
ed Jan. 24, 2011) [hereinafter Afr. Comm’n Guidelines] (“Anybody, either on his or her 
own behalf or on behalf of someone else, can submit a communication to the commission 
denouncing a violation of human rights. Ordinary citizens, a group of individuals, NGOs, 
and states Parties to the Charter can all put in claims. The complainant or author of the 
communication need not be related to the victim of the abuse in any way, but the victim 
must be mentioned.”); ANKUMAH, supra note 9, at 52–53; LINDBLOM, supra note 18, at 
362; see also African Charter, supra note 53, arts. 55–56. 
 58. Afr. Comm’n Guidelines, supra note 57; Chidi Anselm Odinkalu & Camilla 
Christensen, The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights: The Development 
of its Non-State Communication Procedures, 20 HUM. RTS. Q. 235, 273 (1998) (the Afri-
can Commission has “allowed individuals to be represented by NGOs” before it). 
 59. Odinkalu & Christensen, supra note 58, at 279; LINDBLOM, supra note 18, at 361–
62. 
 60. African Charter Protocol, supra note 54, art. 5(3). 
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most 400 NGOs, 61 and the application requirements for obtaining such 
status appear to be relatively minimal. 62  The Protocol also requires, 
however, that the member state involved make a declaration accepting 
the competence of the ACHPR to receive cases brought by such NGOs; 
absent such a declaration, the ACHPR is not able to receive a petition 
from even an NGO with observer status.63 
Article 10 of the Protocol also grants any party to a case before the 
ACHPR the right “to be represented by a legal representative of the par-
ty’s choice,” which presumably would include NGOs.64 As with the In-
ter-American system, neither the Commission nor the ACHPR appear to 
have a system of legal aid to help alleged victims hire a representative. 
Finally, Rule 45 of the ACHPR’s Interim Rules of Procedure permits the 
ACHPR to ask any person or institution for information relevant to a 
case, although it is not clear what the mechanism would be for an NGO 
to submit a request to receive such an invitation.65 NGOs therefore ap-
pear to have the ability to participate in cases before the ACHPR as rep-
resentatives of a party or by invitation. 
II. NGO INVOLVEMENT IN PRACTICE 
It is clear that NGOs have a variety of ways in which they could partic-
ipate in the human rights systems in Europe, the Americas, and Africa. 
To what extent they take advantage of these avenues for participation is 
less clear from the reports and statistics published by the courts and, in 
the Americas and Africa, the commissions. It is therefore necessary to 
examine the actual decisions issued by these bodies to determine the ex-
tent of NGO involvement. 
                                                                                                                                     
 61. See Afr. Comm’n Hum. & Peoples’ Rts. [ACHPR], Activity Rep. of the Afr. 
Comm’n on Hum. & Peoples’ Rts., Submitted in Conformity with Article 54 of the Afr. 
Charter on Hum. & Peoples’ Rts. 7 (2008) (reporting that as of 2008, the African Com-
mission had granted observer status to 380 NGOs). 
 62. See Afr. Comm’n Hum. & Peoples’ Rts. [ACHPR], Resolution on the Criteria for 
Granting and Enjoying Observer Status to Non-Governmental Organizations Working in 
the Field of Human Rights with the African Commission Human and Peoples’ Rights, 
ACHPR /Res.33(XXV)99 (May 5, 1999). But see MURRAY, supra note 9, at 90–92 (the 
African Commission has considered refusing to recognize NGOs that are not legally rec-
ognized in their home country). 
 63. African Charter Protocol, supra note 54, art. 34(6); see also Ibrahim Ali Badawi 
El–Sheikh, Draft Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the 
Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 9 AFR. J. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 943, 946–47 (1997) (describing the history of this provision). 
 64. African Charter Protocol, supra note 54, art. 10(2). 
 65. Interim Rules of Court, AFR. CT. HUM. & PEOPLES’ RTS. 45(2) (2008). 
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To evaluate what information could be feasibly gathered about NGO 
involvement and, to the extent possible, what initial observations or hy-
potheses could be formed based on that information, the decisions by 
each court and, where applicable, commission for the ten-year period 
from 2000 through 2009 were examined. As detailed in the appendix, the 
exact methodology used to identify and evaluate NGO involvement var-
ied based on the publicly available information for the relevant body. For 
all of the bodies, however, it appears to be possible to identify the vast 
majority if not all of the NGO direct involvement in decisions on the 
merits during this time period. As previously discussed, for these purpos-
es an NGO was defined as any organization that was formally constitut-
ed, organizationally separate from government, and non-profit-seeking.66 
While an organization’s possession of these characteristics was generally 
evident by the description of the organization in the relevant decision, 
when necessary, an organization’s NGO status was verified by checking 
other sources, such as the organization’s self-description on its website. 
The 2000 through 2009 time period was selected for several reasons. 
First, 2009 is the most recent year for which all decisions on the merits 
were readily available. Second, late 1998 was the effective date of Proto-
col 11 to the European Convention, which fundamentally changed the 
structure of the European human rights system.67 Third and finally, ten 
years appears to be a sufficient passage of time so as to make any com-
mon patterns or trends unlikely to reflect merely the unique circumstanc-
es of a particular year or few years. 
A. European Court of Human Rights 
From January 1, 2000 through December 31, 2009, the ECHR ren-
dered 10,067 decisions on the merits.68 Of those decisions, 394 or ap-
proximately four percent had direct NGO involvement as follows: 
                                                                                                                                     
 66. See supra nn. 3–5 and accompanying text. 
 67. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
 68. See EUR. CT. H.R., SURVEY OF ACTIVITIES 2000 69 (2001); EUR. CT. H.R., SURVEY 
OF ACTIVITIES 2001 33 (2002); EUR. CT. H.R., SURVEY OF ACTIVITIES 2002 29 (2003); 
EUR. CT. H.R., SURVEY OF ACTIVITIES 2003 32 (2004); EUR. CT. H.R., SURVEY OF 
ACTIVITIES 2004 33 (2005); EUR. CT. H.R., SURVEY OF ACTIVITIES 2005 31 (2006); EUR. 
CT. H.R., SURVEY OF ACTIVITIES 2006 42 (2007); EUR. CT. H.R., SURVEY OF ACTIVITIES 
2007 59 (2008); EUR. CT. H.R., ANNUAL REPORT 2008 133 (2009); EUR. CT. H.R., 
ANNUAL REPORT 2009 145 (2010) [hereinafter ECHR ANNUAL REPORT 2009], for the 
numbers of decisions on the merits for each year from the ECHR’s Surveys of Activities 
for 2000 through 2007, as well as Annual Reports for 2008 and 2009. 
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NGO  
Concentrations 
(10% or more decisions) 
Member State  
Concentrations 
(10% or more decisions) 
Kurdish Human Rights Project 
   39 decisions involving NGOs (10%) 
Lawyers for Human Rights  
Moldova  
   73 decisions (18%) 
Russia 
                                                                                                                                     
69 The “NGO Involved” figures for some years and in total are less than the sum 
of the three types of involvement columns because in a few decisions (eleven 
over the ten-year period) NGOs were involved in more than one capacity.  
Year Decisions 
on Merits 
NGO  
Involved69 
As 
Representative 
As 
Applicant 
As 
Intervener 
2000 446 11 7 2 2 
2001 726 9 2 3 4 
2002 665 12 7 2 5 
2003 548 8 5 0 3 
2004 629 18 13 3 2 
2005 1042 37 29 3 6 
2006 1510 36 29 4 5 
2007 1425 74 55 13 7 
2008 1489 85 69 8 8 
2009 1587 104 89 13 7 
Total 10,067 394 305 51 49 
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   56 decisions involving NGOs (14%) 
Stichting Russian Justice Initiative 
   79 decisions (20%) 
   149 decisions (37%) 
 
 
The relatively low level of involvement by NGOs is consistent with the 
pre-Protocol 11 level of direct NGO involvement before the European 
Commission, identified by other scholars.70 It is also consistent with the 
post-Protocol 11 level of NGO involvement from 1999 until 2003, as 
determined by Anna-Karin Lindblom.71 
Even with the relatively low level of direct NGO involvement, certain 
patterns emerge. First, NGO direct involvement in ECHR decisions on 
the merits primarily came as representatives of the alleged victim(s), alt-
hough in some cases an NGO was either the alleged victim (including 
several cases where an NGO or its members were complaining of delays 
in being able to register formally with the member state) or, slightly 
more rarely, an intervener.72 Second, there is a significant concentration 
within these decisions as to both the member state defendant and the spe-
cific NGO involved. With respect to the member state, almost forty per-
cent of the judgments with direct NGO participation involved Russia as 
compared to approximately eight percent of all judgments on the merits 
during this time period.73 In turn, this concentration appears to be driven 
                                                                                                                                     
 70. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
 71. See LINDBLOM, supra note 18, at 253–54 (identifying “at least” twenty-nine ap-
plications filed by NGOs that resulted in decisions on the merits, as compared to over 
3,300 such decisions during this time period). 
 72. Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, Collection of Data from the Decisions Rendered by the 
African Commission, European Court and Inter–American Commission and Court from 
2000 to 2009 (May 22, 2011) (unpublished collection, Notre Dame University) [hereinaf-
ter Mayer Data]. 
 73. Id. From 2000 through 2009, the ECHR issued 779 decisions on the merits in-
volving Russia as compared to 9,714 decisions on the merits total. See, e.g., ECHR 
ANNUAL REPORT 2009, supra note 68, at 145 (216 decisions on the merits involving Rus-
sia as compared to 1,587 decisions on the merits total in 2009); Survey of Activities 1999, 
at 13–28, EUR. CT. H.R. (2000), available at 
http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/BA4CD581-4E3E-4324-83A6-
1A753F92C1DE/0/SurveyofActivities1999.pdf (listing decisions in 1999, including 132 
decisions on the merits); Ten Years of the “New” European Court of Human Rights 
1998–2008 Situation and Outlook 77, EUR. CT. H.R., (2009), available at 
http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/494676B6-727F-49FE-9158-
17687F914D5D/0/ActesVersionEN.pdf [hereinafter ECHR 1999–2008] (listing 563 deci-
sions on the merits involving Russia as compared to 8,260 decisions on the merits total 
from 1999 through 2008. It is not clear why the total number of decisions on the merits 
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in large part by three specific NGOs. One of those NGOs is the Stichting 
Russian Justice Initiative (“SRJI”), which alone was involved in twenty 
percent of the decisions with direct NGO involvement.74 The other two 
are the European Human Rights Advocacy Center (“EHRAC”) (directly 
involved in twenty-eight decisions) and the Human Rights Center “Me-
morial” (“Memorial”) (directly involved in thirty-two decisions).75 These 
two NGOs appear to work closely together based both on EHRAC’s 
website and the fact that they were both involved as representatives in 
twenty-five decisions.76 After accounting for decisions in which more 
than one of these NGOs was involved, these three NGOs collectively 
accounted for 113 of the 149 decisions with direct NGO participation 
against Russia, or over three-quarters of them.77 These 149 decisions in 
turn represented approximately nineteen percent of the decisions on the 
merits involving Russia during these ten years.78 
The member state with the second highest level of decisions has a 
similar pattern. Almost twenty percent of the judgments on the merits 
with direct NGO participant had Moldova as a defendant, as compared to 
less than two percent of all judgments on the merits over this time peri-
od.79 Again, this concentration appears to be driven in large part by cer-
tain specific NGOs—Lawyers for Human Rights (fifty-six decisions) and 
the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights (Moldova) (eleven decisions, 
including one with Lawyers for Human Rights).80 Together these two 
NGOs accounted for sixty-six of the seventy-three decisions involving 
Moldova, or ninety percent.81 Finally, the seventy-three decisions with 
NGO participation involving Moldova were over forty percent of the 
decisions on the merits involving Moldova during this time period.82 
                                                                                                                                     
provided in these reports for 2000 through 2009 is slightly less than the total figure ob-
tained by reviewing the annual reports and annual surveys for each year during this peri-
od. See supra note 69. 
 74. Mayer Data, supra note 72. 
 75. Id. 
 76. See About Us, EUR. HUM. RTS. ADVOC. CTR., 
http://www.londonmet.ac.uk/research-units/hrsj/affiliated-centres/ehrac/home.cfm (last 
visited Jan. 24, 2011) (“EHRAC has a long-established partnership with the Russian 
NGO, Memorial”). 
 77. Mayer Data, supra note 72. 
 78. See id. 
 79. From 2000 through 2009, the ECHR issued 148 decisions on the merits involving 
Moldova as compared to 9714 decisions on the merits total. See id. 
 80. Mayer Data, supra note 72. 
 81. Id. 
 82. See Id. 
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In Europe, therefore, five NGOs have been involved, primarily as rep-
resentatives, in approximately forty-five percent of the decisions on the 
merits for which direct NGO involvement has been identified (once the 
involvement of multiple NGOs in the same decision has been taken into 
account).83 This NGO concentration also appears to have translated into 
member state concentration, in that these same five NGOs focus exclu-
sively on one of two countries (Russia and Moldova), leading to a dis-
proportionate number of the NGO-involved cases being brought against 
those two member states. This NGO concentration, as well as the appar-
ent agenda-shifting ability of these NGOs through drawing greater atten-
tion to activities of two specific member states, suggests that attention 
should be given to whether and to whom these NGOs are accountable. 
It is natural to first look at SRJI, which was the most active NGO be-
fore the ECHR from 2000 through 2009 as measured by involvement in 
decisions on the merits.84 In part, to demonstrate broad international sup-
port for its efforts, its various governing and advisory bodies appear to be 
drawn primarily from outside of both the North Caucuses region and 
Russia generally, although the staff appears to be primarily if not exclu-
sively Russian.85 Perhaps as significantly, its 2009 funding appears to 
have come primarily from similar, non-Russian sources, including not 
only the Open Society Institute and other private parties concerned with 
human rights, but also the government of Norway and various United 
Nations bodies.86 EHRAC, Memorial through EHRAC, and the Kurdish 
Human Rights Project (the third NGO appearing in ten percent of the 
decisions with direct NGO involvement)87 appear to have similar patterns 
of engagement with the international human rights community.88 These 
                                                                                                                                     
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. ANNUAL REPORT 2009, at 17, RUSSIAN JUST. INITIATIVE  (2010), 
http://www.srji.org/files/reports/2009.pdf [hereinafter RUSSIAN JUSTICE INITIATIVE]. 
 86. Id. at 19. 
 87. Mayer Data, supra note 72. 
 88. See EHRAC ANNUAL REPORT 2009, EUR. HUM. RTS. ADVOC. CTR. 36–37 (2010), 
http://www.londonmet.ac.uk/fms/MRSite/Research/HRSJ/EHRAC/Publications/EHRAC
%20AR09%20COMPLETE%20for%20email.pdf (listing individual and organizational 
affiliations); Donors, EUR. HUM. RTS. ADVOC. CTR., 
http://www.londonmet.ac.uk/research-units/hrsj/affiliated-
centres/ehrac/donors/donors.cfm (last visited Feb. 7, 2011); About KHRP, KURDISH HUM. 
RTS. PROJECT, http://www.khrp.org/about-khrp.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2011) (listing a 
wide range of private and government supporters). Information in English regarding 
Lawyers for Human Rights could not be located. See Noutăţi, LAW. FOR HUM. RTS., 
http://www.lhr.md/ (last visited Feb. 7, 2011) (organization’s website, apparently in Mol-
dovan except the name of the organization, is provided in English). 
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results suggest that these NGOs are both well-known and well-monitored 
within the international human rights community, even without any ap-
parent formal mechanism to ensure such monitoring or accountability. 
B. Inter-American Human Rights Commission and Inter-American Court 
of Human Rights 
Turning now to the Inter-American system, given the gate-keeping 
function of the Inter-American Commission, both the decisions by that 
body and by the IACHR during the 2000 through 2009 period were con-
sidered. Since both bodies have relatively few decisions on the merits 
each year, all of such decisions for the entire time period were reviewed 
to identify possible NGO involvement. Only Commission decisions that 
did not lead to a Court decision were considered, as to the extent an 
NGO was involved in a case that led to a Court decision—including at 
the Commission stage of the proceedings—that is reflected in the figures 
for the Court. Such Commission decisions also do not appear to be pub-
licly reported, except to the extent that they are discussed in the related 
Court decision. The results of this review are as follows: 
 
Inter-American Commission 
 
Year Decisions on 
Merits 
NGO 
Involved89 
As 
Representative 
As 
Applicant 
As 
Amicus 
2000 26 18 18 0 1 
2001 20 9 9 0 0 
2002 11 6 6 0 0 
2003 6 4 3 1 0 
2004 4 3 3 0 0 
                                                                                                                                     
89 As was the case with the ECHR data, the “NGO Involved” figures for some 
years and in total are less than the sum of the three types of involvement col-
umns because in a few decisions (two over the ten-year period) NGOs were in-
volved in more than one capacity. Mayer Data, supra note 72. 
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2005 7 3 3 0 0 
2006 8 4 4 0 0 
2007 4 1 1 0 0 
2008 7 5 4 0 1 
2009 13 7 5 2 1 
Total 106 60 56 3 3 
 
NGO  
Concentrations 
(10% or more decisions) 
Member State 
Concentrations 
(10% or more decisions) 
Corporación Colectivo de Abogados José 
Alvear Restrepo (José Alvear Restrepo Law-
yers’ Collective) (CCAJAR) 
   7 decisions involving NGOs (12%) 
Centro por la Justicia y el Derecho Internac-
ional (Center for Justice and International 
Law) (CEJIL) 
   16 decisions (27%) 
Brazil  
   13 decisions (22%) 
Columbia  
   8 decisions (13%) 
Peru  
   9 decisions (15%) 
United States  
   9 decisions (15%) 
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Inter-American Court 
 
Year Decisions on 
Merits 
NGO 
Involved90 
As 
Representative 
As 
Applicant 
As 
Amicus 
2000 4 0 0 0 0 
2001 7 5 3 0 3 
2002 2 0 0 0 0 
2003 5 5 5 0 0 
2004 11 11 8 0 5 
2005 16 16 15 0 9 
2006 17 14 13 0 4 
2007 10 7 7 1 2 
2008 10 7 5 0 3 
2009 14 10 10 0 0 
Total 96 75 66 1 26 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                     
90 As was the case with the ECHR data, the “NGO Involved” figures for some 
years and in total are less than the sum of the three types of involvement col-
umns because in a few decisions (two over the ten-year period) NGOs were in-
volved in more than one capacity. Id. 
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NGO  
Concentrations 
(10% or more decisions) 
 
Member State 
Concentrations 
(10% or more decisions) 
Asociación Pro Derechos Humanos (Associ-
ation for Human Rights in Peru) 
(APRODEH) 
8 decisions involving NGOs (11%) 
Centro por la Justicia y el Derecho Internac-
ional (Center for Justice and International 
Law) (CEJIL) 
36 decisions (48%) 
Columbia  
   8 decisions (11%) 
Guatemala 
   9 decisions (12%) 
Peru  
   15 decisions (20%) 
 
The pattern of NGO involvement in decisions on the merits by the 
IACHR and the Inter-American Commission is very different in two re-
spects from that found for ECHR. First, while there were far fewer deci-
sions on the merits—approximately two percent of the ECHR’s total tak-
ing into account both the Commission and IACHR—the proportion of 
NGO involvement was much higher.91 For the Commission, NGOs were 
involved directly in a majority of the decisions on the merits, while for 
the IACHR the percentage was almost eighty percent.92 Similar to the 
ECHR, however, when NGOs were involved directly, they were most 
often involved as representatives of the alleged victims (in ninety percent 
of the decisions on the merits with direct NGO involvement before both 
the Commission and the IACHR) as opposed to as alleged victims them-
selves or as third-parties, although the latter occurred in approximately a 
third of the decisions on the merits with direct NGO involvement at the 
IACHR.93 This high proportion of cases involving NGOs is consistent 
with the findings of Lindblom for an earlier period that partially overlaps 
                                                                                                                                     
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
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with the period considered here with respect to the Commission, alt-
hough it is higher with respect to the IACHR.94 
Second, while there was significant NGO concentration—more on that 
issue in a moment—there was less obvious member state concentration. 
Given the high proportion of NGO involvement, comparisons with the 
overall proportion of member state involvement are not particularly 
meaningful, yet for both the Inter-American Commission and the IACHR 
only one member state appeared in twenty percent or more of the deci-
sions in which NGOs were involved, and these member states were dif-
ferent for the Commission (Brazil) and the IACHR (Peru).95 Also, less 
strong was the role of a single NGO in driving these concentrations. For 
decisions by the Commission involving Brazil, the Centro por la Justicia 
y el Derecho Internacional (Center for Justice and International Law) 
(“CEJIL”) was involved in only eight of the twelve decisions, while for 
decisions by the IACHR involving Peru, the most commonly involved 
NGO—Asociación Pro Derechos Humanos (Association for Human 
Rights in Peru) (“APRODEH”)—was involved in only seven of the fif-
teen.96 Unlike the European experience, however, there was one NGO—
CEJIL—that was involved in numerous decisions involving different 
member states, including over a quarter of the Commission decisions 
with direct NGO involvement and almost half of the IACHR decisions 
with direct NGO involvement.97 More specifically, CEJIL represented 
alleged victims against eight different member states before the Commis-
sion and against thirteen member states before the IACHR.98 This limited 
concentration with respect to NGO involvement is consistent with the 
findings of Lindblom for an earlier period that overlapped in part with 
                                                                                                                                     
 94. See LINDBLOM, supra note 18, at 275 (for 1998 through 2003, approximately half 
of the Inter–American Commission case reports on the merits and friendly settlements 
were in cases instituted by NGOs, whether acting alone or ‘with other bodies or individu-
als”); id. at 277–78 (approximately a third of IACHR judgments on the merits involved 
cases that originated with petitions filed by NGOs with the Inter–American Commis-
sion); see also Mónica Pinto, NGOs and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, in 
CIVIL SOCIETY, supra note 9, at 47, 50 (stating, without any more details, that “[t]he great 
majority of complaints registered with the Inter-American Commission . . . are lodged by 
NGOs acting as petitioners”). 
 95. Mayer Data, supra note 72. 
 96. With respect to the Commission, an NGO that, at least at one time, was affiliated 
with CEJIL was involved with two of the cases relating to Brazil. See Diniz Bento da 
Silva v. Brazil, Case 11.517, Inter–Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 23/02, 
OEA/Serv.L./V/II.02, doc. 5 ¶ 1 (2002) (indicating that the Comissão Pastoral da Terra 
[Pastoral Land Commission] was affiliated with CEJIL, at least when the original appli-
cation was filed in 1995). 
 97. Mayer Data, supra note 72. 
 98. Id. 
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the period considered here, although she did not provide details regard-
ing the extent of such concentration.99 
Similar to SRJI, CEJIL appears to be well-integrated into the interna-
tional human rights community. Its Board of Directors includes individu-
als associated with a range of other human rights organizations and 
NGOs, including American University, Columbia University, Human 
Rights Watch, and the Myrna Mack Foundation, as well as indigenous 
human rights organizations in a number of the member states.100 Its fi-
nancial supporters include a broad range of organizations and govern-
ments, including many from outside of member states, such as the Ford 
Foundation, Save the Children Sweden, and the Federal Ministry of For-
eign Relations of Germany.101 At the same time its staff appears to be 
drawn exclusively from the member states.102 
C. African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and African 
Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
The ACHPR only began operations recently and appears to have only 
issued a single judgment to date, which was not on the merits but instead 
concluded that the ACHPR lacked jurisdiction to hear the case at issue.103 
The existence of only a single ACHPR jurisdictional decision in 2009 (or 
ever, it appears) makes it impossible to determine if any patterns exist 
with respect to NGO involvement in cases before the ACHPR. The role 
of the ACHPR is also limited by the fact that as of 2008, only two states 
had allegedly made declarations consenting to the court’s jurisdiction.104 
                                                                                                                                     
 99. See LINDBLOM, supra note 18, at 276–77 (noting that as of 2003, commonly in-
volved NGOs were “CEJIL, the Colombian Commission of Jurists . . . APRODEH[], 
Americas Watch (now Human Rights Watch), and Comisión Ecuménica de Derechose 
Humanos (CEDHU)”). 
 100. The Board of Directors, CEJIL, http://cejil.org/en/cejil/board-directors (last visit-
ed Jan. 21, 2011). 
 101. ACTIVITIES REPORT 2008/9, at 5, CEJIL (2010), 
http://cejil.org/sites/default/files/CEJILs_Report_2008_2009.pdf. 
 102. Staff, CEJIL, http://cejil.org/en/cejil/staff (last visited Feb. 7, 2011). 
 103. Latest Judgments, AFR. CT. HUM. & PEOPLES’ RTS., http://www.african-
court.org/en/cases/latest-judgments/ (last visited Feb. 7, 2011) [hereinafter Latest Judg-
ments]; Michelot Yogogombaye v. The Republic of Senegal, Afr. Ct. Hum. & Peoples’ 
Rts. No. 001/2008  ¶ 37 (Dec. 15, 2009) [hereinafter Senegal Judgment]. 
 104. Senegal Judgment, supra note 103, ¶¶ 17, 35 (discussing how Michelot Yogo-
gombaye alleged that the Republics and States of Senegal and Chad had made such dec-
larations). Furthermore, only twenty-five of the fifty-three African Union member states 
have ratified the Protocol creating the ACHPR. General Information, AFR. CT. HUM. & 
PEOPLES’ RTS., http://www.african-court.org/en/court/mandate/general-information/ (last 
visited Feb. 7, 2011). 
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As for the African Commission, there were only thirty decisions on the 
merits from 2000 through 2009 that had direct NGO involvement, but 
that low number reflects the low number of total decisions on the merits 
during that same period of forty-four.105 Because of the low number of 
decisions, the following table does not provide a year-by-year breakdown 
but instead collects the data for the entire ten-year period: 
 
Year Decisions on 
Merits 
NGO 
Involved106 
As 
Representative 
As 
Applicant 
As 
Amicus 
2000 
to 
2009 
 
44 
 
30 
 
30 
 
3 
 
1 
 
NGO  
Concentrations 
(10% or more decisions) 
Member State 
Concentrations 
(10% or more decisions) 
Institute for Human Rights and Development 
in Africa (IHRDA) 
   6 decisions involving NGOs (20%) 
International Centre for the Legal Protection 
of Human Rights (Interights) 
   5 decisions (17%) 
Nigeria 
   4 decisions (13%) 
Zimbabwe 
   4 decisions (13%) 
 
 
As the table shows, the level of NGO involvement is proportionately 
very high, representing over two-thirds of the decisions on the merits. 
Also, similar to the European and Inter-American systems, NGOs pri-
marily served as representatives of alleged victims, as opposed to rarer 
                                                                                                                                     
 105. Mayer Data, supra note 72. 
106 As was the case with the ECHR data, the “NGO Involved” figures for some 
years and in total are less than the sum of the three types of involvement col-
umns because in a few decisions (two over the ten-year period) NGOs were in-
volved in more than one capacity. Id. 
2011] NGO STANDING AND INFLUENCE 935 
appearances as the alleged victim or as a third party.107 Given the small 
number of decisions, concentrations with respect to NGOs or member 
states are less meaningful than in the other two systems, although at least 
two NGOs—the Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa 
(“IHRDA”) and the International Centre for the Legal Protection of Hu-
man Rights (“Interights”)—were each involved in more than ten percent 
of the decisions (with two decisions involving both of them).108 Con-
sistent with these findings, a previous review of African Commission 
Activity Reports by Lindblom found that a majority of applications that 
led to decisions on the merits from 1997 to 2003 had been filed by one or 
more NGOs.109 Lindblom also found some NGO concentration during 
that time period, although of the three NGOs named by Lindblom as be-
ing frequent parties before the Commission, 110 only Interights appears to 
have remained as heavily involved in the period considered here. 
Neither of the two most frequently involved NGOs appears to have fo-
cused on any particular member state, as IHRDA represented alleged 
victims in cases brought against five different member states and In-
terights in cases brought against four different member states.111 No ob-
vious member state concentrations existed generally either, with only 
Nigeria and Zimbabwe appearing in slightly more than ten percent of the 
decisions involving NGOs.112 The twenty-two remaining decisions in-
volving NGOs are spread among twenty other member states.113 
Finally and similar to SRJI, CEJIL, and other NGOs most frequently 
directly involved in decisions on the merits in the European and Inter-
American human rights systems, both IHRDA and Interights appear to 
be tied into the larger international human rights community. IHRDA’s 
funding base includes both non-African NGO sources such as the Ford 
Foundation and the Swedish NGO Foundation for Human Rights and 
non-member state government sources, such as the Department for Inter-
national Development UK.114 Similarly, the Board of Directors and Ad-
visory Council for the London-based Interights is drawn primarily from 
companies and NGOS from outside the African Commission’s member 
                                                                                                                                     
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. LINDBLOM, supra note 18, at 283 (discussing how twenty-eight out of forty-eight 
“communications had been filed by one or several NGOs”). 
 110. Id. at 284 (noting that the Nigerian organizations Constitutional Rights Project 
and Civil Liberties Organisation had filed multiple communications with the Commis-
sion, as had the British organization Interights). 
 111. Mayer Data, supra note 72. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Funders, IHRDA, http://www.ihrda.org/funders/ (last visited Feb. 7, 2011). 
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states.115 The only deviation from this pattern is that IHRDA’s Board of 
Directors consists entirely of individuals from the member states, alt-
hough one of them (a co-founder of IHRDA) currently works for the 
Open Society Justice Initiative, based in New York.116 Again, these ap-
parently extensive international linkages appear to have developed with-
out any formal requirements by the African Commission or ACHPR. 
III. RAMIFICATIONS OF NGO INVOLVEMENT 
NGOs have many avenues for involvement in the three regional human 
rights enforcement systems considered, including coming forward as al-
leged victims themselves, serving as representatives of alleged victims, 
and seeking the ability to intervene in a pending case as a third party. Yet 
in all three systems the primary avenue for NGO involvement over the 
ten year period ending in 2009 was as representatives of alleged victims. 
This result is perhaps not surprising, since all three systems appear to 
rely heavily on private parties bringing alleged human rights violations to 
the attention of the commissions and courts even though under the Afri-
can and Inter-American human rights enforcement systems, the commis-
sions have pro-active authority to investigate such violations.117 
What is perhaps surprising is the difference in the extent of NGO-
provided representation in the European system as compared to the Inter-
American and African systems. In the European system, NGOs appear to 
have served as representatives in a relatively small proportion of cases 
that resulted in decisions on the merits—approximately four percent dur-
ing the years reviewed—while in the other two systems NGOs served as 
representatives in a majority of such cases.118 While there may be some 
undercounting of NGO involvement, particularly with respect to the Eu-
ropean system for reasons detailed in the appendix, it seems highly un-
likely that any undercounting would significantly change such a dramatic 
difference. 
The reasons for this difference are not self-evident, although several 
hypotheses present themselves. One hypothesis is that the availability of 
legal aid in the European system but not, apparently, in the Inter-
American or African systems makes representing alleged victims more 
financially attractive to private lawyers in Europe, although the apparent-
                                                                                                                                     
 115. See Board of Directors, INTERIGHTS, http://www.interights.org/about-us-
board/index.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2011); International Advisory Council, INTERIGHTS, 
http://www.interights.org/about-us-advisory/index.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2011). 
 116. Board, IHRDA, http://www.ihrda.org/board/ (last visited March 19, 2011). 
 117. See African Charter, supra note 53, arts. 45–46; see also American Convention, 
supra note 40, art. 41. 
 118. Mayer Data, supra note 72. 
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ly relatively low level of such aid would argue against this reason.119 An-
other, also financially based hypothesis, is that the ECHR’s common 
practice of awarding legal costs to alleged victims whose claims are suc-
cessful may also make cases more attractive to private lawyers, although 
the fact that the vast majority of applications fail (primarily on admissi-
bility grounds) makes reliance on such awards a risky proposition at 
best.120 Finally, a perhaps more likely hypothesis is that, for the most 
part, the private bar in European member states is sufficiently large, fi-
nancially stable, and not vulnerable to retaliation such that there are suf-
ficient private lawyers willing to pursue human rights cases even if there 
is little chance of compensation for doing so.121 Which, if any, of these 
hypotheses explains the apparent disparity in the number of NGOs repre-
senting alleged victims in the Inter-American and African systems as 
opposed to the European system is beyond the scope of this article, but 
could be a direction for future research into the operation of these sys-
tems and the defense of human rights more generally. However, even 
without knowing the exact reasons for this difference, it is possible to 
draw some ramifications for the development of human rights NGOs 
from this difference, as is detailed below. 
A second important difference between the various systems is with re-
spect to member state concentrations. In Europe, while NGOs are in-
volved in a relatively small proportion of cases, those cases are dispro-
portionately focused on two member states (Russian and Moldova) that 
are involved in almost two-thirds of the decisions with direct NGO in-
volvement.122 That concentration is substantially higher than the propor-
tion of all decisions on the merits involving those two countries.123 While 
                                                                                                                                     
 119. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
 120. See, e.g., ECHR 1999–2008, supra note 73, at 77, 79 (reporting 181,965 
“[a]pplications declared inadmissible or struck off” by the ECHR from 1999 through 
2008, as compared to 8,260 decisions on the merits during the same time period); Taking 
a Case to the European Court of Human Rights, supra note 39 (noting that while private 
lawyers may be willing to take a case under a conditional fee agreement, they may be 
reluctant to do so because of the risk of not winning the case and therefore not being 
paid). 
 121. While it may also be that domestic systems for resolving alleged human rights 
violations are relatively effective in most European member states, the statistics for all 
decisions on the merits from 1999 through 2008 indicate that alleged victims from all of 
the member states seek relief at the ECHR; it is just that alleged victims from most of the 
member states do not appear to be represented by NGOs in the vast majority of cases. 
See, e.g., ECHR 1999–2008, supra note 73, at 80 (showing judgments involving every 
member state, except Montenegro and Monaco). 
 122. Mayer Data, supra note 72. 
 123. Id. 
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some member state concentrations appear in the other two systems, they 
are significantly more muted. This concentration in Europe appears to 
have been the result of five NGOs that focus all of their activities on the-
se two member states,124 demonstrating that a relatively small handful of 
NGOs can have a significant effect on the ECHR’s docket of cases. 
This observation leads to an important similarity between at least the 
European and Inter-American systems: the disproportionate role of one 
or a handful of NGOs. In Europe this disproportionate role is found with 
respect to the five NGOs that have brought cases against two specific 
member states.125 In the Americas, this disproportionate role is found 
with respect to a single NGO (CEJIL) that does not have a particular 
member state focus.126 In both systems, however, a single NGO or small 
group of NGOs significantly impacted the docket of the relevant bodies 
and therefore, presumably, the shaping of human rights law by those 
bodies (and, therefore, probably, the behavior of the targeted member 
states). 
These observations suggest that the development and support of a few, 
or even a single, human rights NGO can have a profound effect on the 
development of human rights law in a region of the world. In Europe, 
this effect is seen through a handful of NGOs focused on member states 
that appear, for whatever reasons, to lack a private bar that is willing and 
able to bring claims of alleged human rights violations to the ECHR—a 
lack that does not apparently exist in most European member states. In 
the Americas, this NGO role is seen in the form of a single NGO that 
works throughout the region. In Africa, it appears that neither level of 
NGO concentration exists as of yet, although there are at least two NGOs 
that appear to be candidates for stepping into such a role on a regional-
wide basis.127 
These observations also have ramifications for the issue of NGO ac-
countability that is the focus of this Symposium. Given the dispropor-
tionate role of a relatively few NGOs in this regional human rights en-
forcement system, it is natural to ask whether these NGOs have account-
                                                                                                                                     
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. Of course, the existence of committed and well-resourced NGOs is only one 
ingredient for a successful regional human rights enforcement system. See, e.g., George 
Mukundi Wachira, African Court On Human and Peoples’ Rights: Ten Years On and Still 
No Justice, 2008 MINORITY RTS. GRP. INT’L 10–12 (noting other concerns about the ef-
fectiveness of the African Commission); Danwood Mzikenge Chirwa, African Regional 
Human Rights System: The Promise of Recent Jurisprudence on Social Rights, in SOCIAL 
RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 48, at 335–36. 
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ability to outside individuals and groups to ensure that they use this in-
fluence appropriately. This is especially true since there do not appear to 
be any significant formal or legal limitations on the structure, leadership, 
funding, or other characteristics of NGOs that represent alleged victims 
or otherwise appear before the regional human rights bodies. Even a cur-
sory review of the most heavily involved NGOs reveals, however, that 
well known and reputable individuals and groups from both within and 
outside of the relevant member states appear to provide significant over-
sight to these NGOs both through serving on the governing and advisory 
boards of these NGOS and through providing funding.128 While a more 
in-depth review of these NGOs could be done, an initial review of these 
groups does not reveal a lack of accountability. 
This apparent accountability, even without any formal or legal re-
quirements, combined with the relatively wide open access to the region-
al human rights bodies, not only for NGOs but for all types of organiza-
tions, strongly suggests that there is no need in this context for any for-
mal or legal limits or requirements on NGOs seeking to participate in 
proceedings between these bodies. This conclusion is in contrast to the 
limitations, discussed by some of my fellow presenters, on what groups 
qualify as “NGOs” for purposes of gaining a place at the table at other 
international bodies, such as the United Nations, the World Health Or-
ganization, and the World Trade Organization.129 This contrast makes 
sense, however, once one realizes that for the latter entities, organiza-
tions identified as “NGOs” have special access to deliberations and deci-
sion-making processes that is not enjoyed by other private parties. For 
the regional human rights bodies discussed here, there is no such special 
access. Instead, the filter for involvement—particularly in decisions on 
the merits—is the merits (and admissibility) of the underlying case or the 
usefulness to the tribunal of the information presented (for amicus curiae 
or interveners) and not the intrinsic characteristics of the presenter or 
their representative (beyond perhaps a connection to a member state). It 
therefore appears unnecessary to attempt to limit the definition of 
“NGO” for purposes of appearing before the regional human rights bod-
ies in any significant way (except perhaps for requiring a connection to a 
member state). This conclusion suggests that the decision to limit access 
to the African court to only NGOs granted observer status before the Af-
rican commission imposed an unnecessary barrier to NGO involvement 
with that court.130 
                                                                                                                                     
 128. See supra nn. 86–89, 101–03, and 115–16 and accompanying text. 
 129. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
 130. See supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
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CONCLUSION 
This study is limited to decisions on the merits and therefore does not 
explore the role of NGOs in bringing alleged violations to these bodies 
that are either unsuccessful because of a lack of admissibility or other 
defect, or are resolved through settlement or other means short of a deci-
sion on the merits. This study also does not explore other means by 
which NGOs may influence regional human rights enforcement systems. 
Nevertheless, the observations described above indicate that it is worth-
while to consider not only the level of direct NGO involvement in a par-
ticular regional human rights enforcement system, but also to consider 
the patterns of that involvement and to compare those patterns between 
systems. Doing so may provide indications of which NGOs, and in what 
locations, are doing the most to not only protect individual victims but 
also to shape the agendas of the commissions and courts that make up 
these systems. Such indications may in turn suggest where attention 
should be directed to ensure the strength of such critical human rights 
NGOs. In particular, this study reveals the critical role of NGOs in repre-
senting alleged victims, particularly in countries or regions where it ap-
pears the private legal bar is not, for whatever reasons, providing such 
representation. By identifying and supporting such NGOs, the work of 
the regional human rights enforcement systems may then be significantly 
enhanced. 
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APPENDIX 
METHODOLOGY 
1. In General 
Year: The year of each decision was determined based on the date of 
that decision reported in the decision itself. For dating issues that arose 
with respect to the African Commission, see the section below relating to 
that commission. 
 
Decisions on Merits: Whether a decision was on the merits was deter-
mined based on the classification provided by the relevant body (com-
mission or court), if available, or on a review of the decision itself. Deci-
sions on the merits were defined for these purposes as decisions that 
reached an ultimate conclusion regarding whether the member state in-
volved had, or had not, violated the asserted portions of the relevant hu-
man rights document. Decisions on the merits therefore did not include 
the following types of decisions: 
 Admissibility Decisions: Decisions regarding whether the applicants 
had met the threshold requirements for consideration of their claims, 
such as exhaustion of domestic remedies, unless an admissibility de-
cision was part of a decision that also determined whether there had 
been a violation. 
 Decisions Closing Cases for Other Reasons: These decisions includ-
ed decisions memorializing settlements by the parties, decisions ac-
knowledging withdrawn applications, and decisions closing cases be-
cause of a failure on the part of the applicant to pursue their case. 
 Decisions Reconsidering Earlier Decisions on Merits: Such decisions 
included, for example, IACHR decisions interpreting earlier deci-
sions on the merits in the same case. 
NGO Involved: Whether a decision involved an NGO was determined 
by reviewing each decision identified as possibly having NGO direct 
involvement (using the methods described below for each relevant body) 
for entities that were NGOs. Whether a named entity was an NGO was 
determined based on the description of the entity in the decision, in other 
decisions of the same body, or, absent such information, the description 
of the entity provided by the entity itself on its website. For purposes of 
this article, entities identified as political parties were not considered 
NGOs because of their mixed private/public character. The instances of 
political parties directly involved in decisions on the merits were also 
942 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 36:3 
relatively rare, with the parties generally among the alleged victims in 
those decisions. 
Since this methodology required that the NGO involved be identified 
in the decision, it is possible that NGO involvement was undercounted to 
the extent the individual representatives involved in a given case in fact 
worked for an NGO but the NGO itself was not identified in the opinion. 
For example, in at least four Inter-American Commission decisions in-
volving death row inmates, the United Kingdom attorney who represent-
ed the inmates was identified in the decisions as associated with a private 
law firm, even though he was also associated with an NGO (the Death 
Penalty Project) housed at that firm at the time.131 Because, however, the 
NGO was not identified in the decisions, those decisions were not count-
ed as having direct NGO involvement. Similarly, an IACHR decision 
identified two individuals as representatives of the alleged victims who 
work for the Center for Civil and Human Rights at Notre Dame Law 
School, but that association was not mentioned in the decision.132 Again, 
because the NGO was not identified in the decision, that decision was 
not counted as having direct NGO involvement. Finally, in a number of 
decisions before the ECHR, the Inter-American Commission, and the 
IACHR, representatives were identified as professors but there is nothing 
to indicate that the institutions where they teach are themselves involved 
                                                                                                                                     
 131. In each decision the representative of the alleged victim is identified only as Saul 
Lehrfreund of the London, United Kingdom law firm of Simons Muirhead & Burton. 
Paul Lallion v. Grenada, Case 11.765, Inter–Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 55/02, 
OEA/Ser.L./V/II.02, doc. 5 rev. 1 ¶ 1 (2002); Benedict Jacob v. Grenada, Case 12.158, 
Inter–Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 56/02, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.02, doc. 5 rev. 1 ¶ 1 
(2002); Denton Aitken v. Jamaica, Case 12.275, Inter–Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 
58/02, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.02, doc. 5 rev. 1 ¶ 1 (2002); Dave Sewell v. Jamaica, Case 
12.347, Inter–Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 76/02, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.02, doc. 5 rev. 1 ¶ 
1 (2002). Saul Lehrfreund is, however, also the co-founder and joint Executive Director 
of The Death Penalty Project, an NGO that was housed at the Simons Muirhead & Burton 
firm until 2005. Executive Directors and Staff, THE DEATH PENALTY PROJECT, 
http://www.deathpenaltyproject.org/content_pages/2 (last visited Jan. 24, 2011); Direc-
tors and Trustees, THE DEATH PENALTY PROJECT, 
http://www.deathpenaltyproject.org/content_pages/8 (last visited Mar. 1, 2011). 
 132. Miguel Castro–Castro Prison v. Peru, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, 
Inter–Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 160 (Nov. 25, 2006); H. Sofia Galván Puente, Legislative 
Measures as Guarantees of Non-Repetition: A Reality in the Inter-American Court, and a 
Possible Solution for the European Court, REVISTA IIDH 69, 89 (2009) (discussing how 
in “Castro Castro v. Peru . . . the Center for Civil and Human Rights of the University of 
Notre Dame represented the victims”). 
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in the case.133 Such decisions are therefore also not counted as having 
direct NGO involvement. 
For purposes of this Article, direct NGO involvement did not include 
merely a mention of an NGO in the facts at issue, such as, for example, 
as a participant in the domestic proceedings involving the claims asserted 
or as a source of evidence such as a report provided by one of the par-
ties.134 Similarly, direct NGO involvement did not include mention of an 
NGO as a group to which the alleged victim belonged or sought to be-
long if the NGO itself was not a party to the proceedings before the rele-
vant body. Finally, references to bar associations were not counted as 
direct NGO involvement when the references were made only for pur-
poses of identifying the bar association to which the individual repre-
sentatives of alleged victims belonged or as a source of information re-
garding whether legal fee reimbursement requests were reasonable, and 
lacked any indication that the bar association itself was party to the pro-
ceedings before the relevant body. 
 
Role of NGO (Representative, Applicant, or Amicus Curi-
ae/Intervener): The role of the NGO was determined by reviewing each 
decision identified as having direct NGO involvement. The NGO was 
classified as a representative if it was explicitly identified as such for the 
alleged victims, or if the NGO was identified as the applicant but the al-
leged victims were individuals or entities other than the NGO itself. The 
NGO was classified as an applicant if the NGO itself was identified in 
the decision as the alleged victim or one of the alleged victims. Finally, 
the NGO was classified as an amicus curiae or intervener only if explic-
itly identified as such in the decision. 
2. Specific Bodies 
a. European Court of Human Rights135 
Given the volume of decisions on the merits from 2000 to 2009, deci-
sions in which NGOs were involved were identified initially by conduct-
ing a search for common words and terms associated with NGOs using 
                                                                                                                                     
 133. See, e.g., Cesar Fierro v. United States, Case 11.331, Inter–Am. Comm’n H.R., 
Report No. 99/03, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.118, doc. 5 rev. 2 ¶ 1 (2003) (identifying one of the 
representatives of the alleged victim as a Professor of Law at Ohio State University). 
 134. See LINDBLOM, supra note 18, at 328 (noting the use by non–NGOs of NGO ma-
terials as evidence). 
 135. ECHR, http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/homepage_EN (last visited Jan. 24, 2011). 
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the Lexis database of these decisions.136 The Lexis database was chosen, 
as opposed to the ECHR’s own HUDOC database, 137 because of the ver-
satility and speed of the former database. To confirm the accuracy of the 
Lexis database, parallel searches in the HUDOC database for 2009 were 
also conducted, which found all of the same cases as identified through 
the Lexis database using the same search terms. All of the decisions 
found through this search were then reviewed to determine both whether 
the decision was on the merits and whether an NGO was directly in-
volved, using the criteria described in the “In General” section above. 
For example, a decision might include the word “association” because 
the alleged victims asserted a violation of freedom of association, not 
because an “association” was a party to the proceedings. 
The search results also revealed a number of decisions where an entity 
clearly identified as an NGO either in other cases or through other 
sources was not so identified in that particular decision, leading to the 
question of whether the search results were under-inclusive because of 
such omissions. Searches using the names of the NGOs identified as such 
in other decisions (except for NGOs with such common names that they 
would yield numerous false results, e.g., Justice, Liberty) revealed an 
additional ninety-three decisions with direct NGO involvement. Even 
with these additional searches, however, it is possible that some NGOs 
that either were not identified through the original search terms or had 
too common names to be searched for using those names in fact directly 
participated in ECHR decisions but, because they were not identified in 
any way as NGOs in the decision text, their participation is not reflected 
in the reported results. 
                                                                                                                                     
 136. See Source Information, LEXISNEXIS, 
http://w3.lexis.com/research2/source/srcinfo.do?_m=3a4605c03ad091a4af6b2e43b7e49e
fb&src=360688&wchp=dGLzVlz-
zSkAB&_md5=0c2131b4355b53915286bd9781cdf827 (last visited Jan. 24, 2011). The 
database contains decisions from November 1960 through current, as received directly 
from the ECHR. Id. The search terms used were: “association”; “charitable organiza-
tion”; “charity”; “NGO”; “N.G.O.”; “non-for-profit”; “non-governmental organization”; 
“non-profit”; “nonprofit”; “not-for-profit”; “NPO”; “religious group”; and “religious 
organization”. Id. Reflecting the British spelling, the terms including the word “organiza-
tion” were also searched for using “organisation” instead. Mayer Data, supra note 72. 
 137. HUDOC Database, ECHR, http://www.echr.coe.int/ECHR/EN/Header/Case-
Law/HUDOC/HUDOC+database/ (last visited Jan. 24, 2011). 
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b. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights138 
The decisions on the merits by the Inter-American Commission were 
identified by relying on the Commission’s own classification of its deci-
sions, which it divides into “Admissible,” “Inadmissible,” “Friendly Set-
tlement,” and, more recently “Archival Decisions” categories as well as 
“Merits.”139 The full text of all of the Commission’s decisions is availa-
ble on the Commission’s website, divided both by these classifications 
and by the year in which the Commission issued the decision.140 For the 
2000 through 2009 time period, all of the “Merits” decisions on the 
Commission’s website were reviewed for direct NGO involvement based 
on the methodology described in the “In General” section above. 
c. Inter-American Court of Human Rights141 
The full text of all of IACHR’s decisions are available on the IACHR’s 
website in chronological order.142 For the 2000 through 2009 time period, 
all of the IACHR’s decisions were reviewed to determine if they were 
decisions on the merits and, if they were, for direct NGO involvement, 
using the methodology described in the “In General” section above for 
both determinations. 
d. African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights143 
The full texts of the African Commission’s decisions are available on 
the Commission’s website in chronological order based on the date of the 
filing of the relevant application (called a “communication”). For deci-
sions involving multiple applications, the decision is listed based on the 
earliest application filed. This ordering made it difficult to easily identify 
decisions issued from 2000 through 2009. To overcome this difficulty, 
all decisions involving applications filed in 1993 or later—including de-
cisions involving multiple applications when one or more of the applica-
                                                                                                                                     
 138. INTER–AM. COMM’N H.R., http://www.cidh.oas.org/DefaultE.htm (last visited Jan. 
24, 2011). 
 139. E.g., Cases Published During the Year 2009, INTER–AM. COMM’N H.R., 
http://www.cidh.oas.org/casos/09.eng.htm (last visited Jan. 24, 2011). 
 140. Cases Published by the IACHR by Year, INTER–AM. COMM’N H.R., 
http://www.cidh.oas.org/casos.eng.htm (last visited Jan. 24, 2011). 
 141. CORTE INTERAMERICANA DE DERECHOS HUMANOS [INTER–AM. CT. H.R.], 
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/index.cfm?CFID=842550&CFTOKEN=49913401 (last visited 
Jan. 24, 2011). 
 142. Jurisprudencia casos contenciosos, CORTE INTERAMERICANA DE DERECHOS 
HUMANOS, http://www.corteidh.or.cr/casos.cfm (last visited Jan. 24, 2011). 
 143. AFR. COMM’N HUM. & PEOPLES’ RTS., 
http://www.achpr.org/english/_info/news_en.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2011). 
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tions had been filed in 1993 or later—were reviewed to determine if the 
decision had been issued in the relevant time period. While several deci-
sions based on applications filed in 1993 and 1994 lacked a date for the 
decision (including lacking any mention of the session of the Commis-
sion at which the decision had been rendered, which would have indirect-
ly identified the year in which the Commission had issued the decision), 
only one of those decisions was a decision on the merits.144 Given the 
fact that this decision was on a 1993 application, the decision itself was 
relatively short (less than three pages), and there was nothing in the deci-
sion to indicate that consideration of the application had been unduly 
delayed (in fact, if anything the indications were to the contrary in that 
the Commission had declared the application admissible at the Commis-
sion’s 16th session, held in 1994), it was decided that the Commission 
almost certainly rendered this decision before 2000 and so it was not in-
cluded in the data reported in the main text.145 
All decisions found to have been issued by Commission from 2000 
through 2009 were then reviewed to determine if they were decisions on 
the merits and, if they were, for direct NGO involvement, using the 
methodology described in the “In General” section above for both deter-
minations. 
e. African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights146 
The ACHPR’s website lists only a single judgment (with two opin-
ions), issued by the ACHPR in late 2009.147 That judgment is not a deci-
sion on the merits, as the term is defined for purposes of this article, be-
cause the ACHPR determined that it had no jurisdiction to hear the 
case.148 The ACHPR does not appear to have issued any other decisions 
from 2000 through 2009.149 
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